the timing of lawmaking

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Legal reasoning, pronouncements of judgment, the design and implementation of statutes, and even constitution-making and discourse all depend on timing. This compelling study examines the diverse interactions between law and time, and provides important perspectives on how law's architecture can be understood through time. The book revisits older work on legal transitions and breaks new ground on timing rules, especially with respect to how judges, legislators and regulators use time as a tool when devising new rules. At its core, The Timing of Lawmaking goes directly to the heart of the most basic of legal debates: when should we respect the past, and when should we make a clean break for the future?

This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The traditional boundaries of these two disciplines have somehow inhibited a full understanding of the functioning of and the evolution of economic and legal systems. It has often been the case that these boundaries have had to be reshaped, and sometimes abolished, before either one of the two disciplines could successfully clarify the real life problems arising from the complex institutions of contemporary societies. The contributions to this volume encompass some of the core controversial issues in law and economics arising from interactions between legal orderings and economic institutions. They include: the nature of institutional and legislative change and the emergence of strong institutional complementarity in legal positions the relationship between private orderings and the role of the State in enforcing contracts and defining property rights the nature and dynamics of endogenous enforcement and the analysis of governance models and corporate ethics. Part of the renowned Siena Studies in Political Economy series, this book will be an essential read for postgraduates and researchers in the fields of law and economics, and the economics of institutions.

The Economics of Lawmaking explores the relative advantages and limits of alternative sources of law. Professors Francesco Parisi and Vincy Fon view the sources of law through a law and economics lens, and consider the important issue of institutional design in lawmaking. They consider the respective advantages and proper scope of application of four fundamental sources of law: legislation, judge-made law, customary law, and international law. The defining features of these four sources of law are examined using the formal methods of public choice theory: lawmaking through legislation; lawmaking through adjudication; lawmaking through practice; and lawmaking through agreement. This book begins by examining the sources of law dependent on collective political decision-making, such as legislation. Multiple issues are considered, such as optimal specificity of law, optimal timing of legal intervention and optimal territorial scope of law, and include a thorough discussion on the sources of law derived from judges' decisions, such as common law. Parisi and Fon provide an extensive study on the roles of litigation and judicial path-dependence on judge-made law, biases in the evolution of legal remedies through litigation, and the effect of alternative doctrines of legal precedent, such as stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. They also consider the customary sources of law, with special attention on the mechanisms that determine their emergence and evolution, and explore sources of law derived from international treaties and conventions. The Economics of Lawmaking is the first systematic law and economics treatment of this field and will shed new light on the process of lawmaking.

Recent constitutional thinking has directed its attention to the profound impact of 'soft' norms on the way legislation is made. This book identifies the European Union's impact assessment regime as a source of these norms. In 2002 the European Commission - later followed by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers - committed to performing rigorous assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of policy options before adopting (legislative) proposals. Applying a 'constitutional lens' to this 'regulatory' topic, Anne Meuwese examines both the details and the framework of IA in EU lawmaking to date, drawing attention to its strengths, its contradictions, and its power to enhance the deliberative quality of legislative debates. Integrating the perspectives of political scientists and economists with the concerns of legal scholars and practitioners, Dr Meuwese describes and interrelates such aspects of the subject as the following: the potential role of impact assessment as a catalyst of legal principles, by emphasising or overriding norms that govern both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the EU legislative process; the 'constitutional tasks' of impact assessment as applied to European legislative proposals, especially relating to subsidiarity, proportionality, and the precautionary principle; the formal and informal extension of the scope of impact assessment beyond the co-decision procedure; the question whether impact assessment crosses the line between informing the legislator and fettering legislative discretion. In the course of her analysis Dr Meuwese develops models for possible usages of IA in EU lawmaking, analyses the implementation of impact assessment processes in the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council as well as the roles of relevant 'co-actors', and offers results of empirical research in the forms of a survey of EU legislative practice and in-depth case studies of four EU legislative dossiers.

A study of legislative developments in areas of law and policy devolved to the Scottish Parliament.

The book covers issues of constitutional design, legislative procedures and agenda control four Central American cases in a comparative perspective. The results relate to the critical view that presidential systems are inherently prone to institutional deadlock, deriving from their rigid constitutional design. My findings suggest that constitutional rules only determine broad parameters of variation, and that greater attention should be paid to the endogenous procedural design of the legislative process of decision-making in the explanation of institutional performance and inter-branch dynamics. The work is comparative and bridges quantitative and qualitative analysis. The data employed are original of lawmaking in one legislative term for the four cases under analysis. A final set of normative reflections includes ideas on the relevance of understanding constitutional choice. The theoretical, substantive and methodological implications of the findings are thus reinserted into a normative view on procedural justice and the quality of democracy.

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