On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that had negotiated with Tehran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany-collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA required constraints that seek to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran. The agreement replaced the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), an interim nuclear accord in effect from 2014 to 2016. Congress did not enact a resolution of disapproval of the JCPOA by the deadline of September 17, 2015, which was set by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17); the JCPOA formally took effect on "Adoption Day" (October 18, 2015). "Implementation Day" was declared by the P5+1 on January 16, 2016, representing the completion of Iran's nuclear requirements; entry into effect of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA; and the start of sanctions relief stipulated in the agreement. Officials from both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump Administrations have certified that Iran has abided by its JCPOA commitments. The Obama Administration and other P5+1 leaders asserted that the JCPOA is the most effective means to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon are available indefinitely. The agreement contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran violates its commitments. Top Trump Administration officials have argued that the JCPOA does not adequately serve U.S. interests because the extensive sanctions relief provided under the accord gives Iran additional resources to conduct "malign activities" in the region, and does not restrict Iran's development of ballistic missiles. Resolution 2231, which was adopted in July 2015, prohibits arms transfers to or from Iran, but only for five years, and contains a voluntary restriction on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles for only up to eight years. On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran-Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany-opposed the U.S. decision and have been meeting with Iranian officials to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has pledged to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement.
Oil and God is an unabashed realpolitik analysis of U.S. oil geopolitics and Saudi Arabia’s symbiotic attachment to Wahhabism. Oil and God contends that oil hegemony is world hegemony. The U.S. has protected the al-Sauds since 1945. Some 35,000 U.S. soldiers are in regional air and naval bases to protect the oil fields and ruling sheikhs. In Washington’s hands, Saudi oil is a non-lethal WMD. Not even the 9/11 atrocities could make Washington punish Riyadh. Oil and God investigates why Iraq was destroyed, why Iran was allowed to dominate Baghdad, and why Shi’ite/Sunni wars continue to burn. Once oil is replaced by green energy, Washington will abandon Riyadh, Saudi cash will dwindle, and Wahhabi terror will diminish.
Release on 2017-12-20 | by Nader Entessar,Kaveh L. Afrasiabi
Author: Nader Entessar,Kaveh L. Afrasiabi
Pubpsher: Rowman & Littlefield
Category: Political Science
This book essentially builds upon Entessar & Afrasiabi’s Iran Nuclear Negotiations (Rowman & Littlefied, October 2015), focusing this time on the final nuclear agreement, the ensuing debates around it, and its global and regional ramifications especially in the Middle East.
This book focuses on oil politics and the development of nuclear technology in Iran, providing a broader historical context to understand Iran’s foreign relations and nuclear policy. The author assesses Iran's encounters with the West in light of major confrontations both in terms of open conflict as well as controversies surrounding treaties with foreign powers. In seeking to understand the geopolitics of oil in direct parallel to the geopolitics of nuclear technology, the book concentrates on Iran’s struggles to nationalize its oil, neo-colonialism, the formation of the oil consortium, and the more recent US backtracking on the nuclear deal with Iran.
It goes without saying that world peace is the ultimate goal, but what makes it so hard to achieve? Certain regions of the world have been engaged in conflicts that appear unending, despite the efforts of many to help them find solutions. Conflict will always be present, but what is the best way to deal with it? Is diplomacy always effective, or are there times when military action is the only answer? The viewpoints in this volume highlight various conflicts around the world and analyze the methods taken to resolve them.
Release on 2019-07-26 | by Institute for Energy Law of the Center for American & International Law
Author: Institute for Energy Law of the Center for American & International Law
The annual proceedings of the Institute on Oil and Gas Law, part of The Institute for Energy Law of The Center for American and International Law's continuing education program, provide expert guidance on current legal issues involving the oil, gas and energy industries. Published in condensed and edited form, the proceedings offer oil, gas and energy practitioners practical ideas and solutions for dealing with the impact of new laws and regulations. The timeliness of the topics and the insight and experience of the authors make The Institute for Energy Law of The Center for American and International Law's Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law a valuable addition to the library of anyone with a practice concerned with oil and gas law.
Release on 2019-01-21 | by Congressional Research Service
Author: Congressional Research Service
Pubpsher: Independently Published
Category: Political Science
Summary Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement-the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)-which exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Irans nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Irans nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Irans ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses. The Trump Administration cited these deficiencies of the JCPOA in its May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would exit the JCPOA and reimpose all U.S. secondary sanctions by November 4, 2018. The stated intent of Trump Administration policy is to apply maximum economic pressure on Iran to compel it to change its behavior on the various issues of concern to the United States, including its support for regional armed factions. The U.S. exit from the JCPOA has raised concerns about the potential for the United States and Iran to come into direct armed conflict in the region, and the Administration asserts that it might react militarily to provocative actions by Iran. Because of the many facets and issues involved in U.S. policy, on August 16, 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced formation of an Iran Action Group to coordinate all aspects of State Department activity on Iran. In September 2018, the Iran Action Group issued a report, entitled Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran's Destructive Activities that accused Iran of a long litany of behaviors, including human rights abuses that threaten U.S. interests. Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Irans regime, and that the underlying, if unstated, goal of Trump Administration policy is to bring about regime collapse. A regime change strategy presumably would take advantage of divisions and fissures within Iran, as well as evident popular unrest. Hassan Rouhani, a moderate who seeks to improve Irans relations with the West, including the United States, won successive presidential elections in 2013 and 2017, and reformist and moderate candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent municipal council elections in all the major cities. But hardliners continue to control the state institutions that maintain internal security in large part through suppression. In part as a response to repression as well as economic conditions, unrest erupts periodically, most recently during December 2017-January 2018, and sporadically since then. President Trump has indicated a willingness to meet with Iranian leaders, but his key foreign policy subordinates have set strict conditions for any broader improvement in relations-conditions the regime is highly unlikely to meet. Administration officials have been increasingly highlighting Irans human rights abuses and systemic corruption in an apparent attempt to build international support for sanctions and possibly also to weaken support for the regime within Iran.
U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial-but with varying degrees of intensity-since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced. In 2010, the Obama Administration led a campaign of broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program-an effort that contributed to Iran's acceptance of the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That agreement exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain binding limits on Iran's missile program, its regional influence, or human rights abuses. The Trump Administration cited the JCPOA's deficiencies in its May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would exit the accord and reimpose all U.S. secondary sanctions. The stated intent of that step, as well as subsequent imposition of additional sanctions on Iran, is to apply "maximum pressure" on Iran to compel it to change its behavior, including negotiating a new JCPOA that takes into account the broad range of U.S. concerns. Iran has responded to the maximum pressure campaign by undertaking actions against commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and by undertaking modest violations of some JCPOA restrictions. Before and since the escalation of U.S.-Iran tensions in May 2019, President Trump has indicated a willingness to meet with Iranian leaders. However, Administration statements and reports detail a long litany of objectionable behaviors that Iran must change for there to be any dramatic change in U.S.-Iran relations. Iranian leaders say they will not talk with the Administration unless and until it reenters the 2015 JCPOA. Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran's regime, and that the underlying, if unstated, goal of Trump Administration policy is to bring about regime collapse. In the context of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions in 2019, President Trump has specifically denied that this is his Administration's goal. Any U.S. regime change strategy presumably would take advantage of divisions and fissures within Iran, as well as evident popular unrest. In part as a response to repression as well as economic conditions, unrest erupts periodically, most recently during December 2017-January 2018, and sporadically since then, including in response to the regime's apparent mishandling of relief efforts for vast flooding in southwestern Iran. To date, the unrest is not at a level where it threatens the leadership's grip on power. U.S. pressure has widened leadership differences in Iran. Hassan Rouhani, who seeks to improve Iran's relations with the West, including the United States, won successive presidential elections in 2013 and 2017, and reformist and moderate candidates won overwhelmingly in concurrent municipal council elections in all the major cities. Nevertheless, hardliners continue to control the state institutions that maintain internal security largely through suppression.